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Abstract 
A legal trial, Felman states, ‘is presumed to be a search for truth, but, technically, it is a search for a 
decision, and thus, in essence, it seeks not simply truth but a finality: a force of resolution’ (1997: 738). 
The opening quote to my article reflects one scene of an attempt to support such resolution — that is, a 
search for knowledge of the ‘actual’ force required to injure a body, thereby eliminating or limiting 
speculation. Associate Professor John Hilton, a forensic pathologist and the former Director of the New 
South Wales Institute of Forensic Medicine (NSWIFM, also known as ‘the Glebe morgue’), made the 
remark on the Australian television program Sunday in March 2001, in response to a number of 
allegations, including that dead bodies in the care of the Institute were subject to ‘unethical’ forensic 
medical practice, such as ‘stabbing’ experiments, to reproduce or replicate injuries to the deceased. 
Public outrage followed his comments and, as a result of the allegations raised on Sunday, the then NSW 
Health Minister launched an independent inquiry into practices at the mortuary and Hilton was removed 
from his position as Director. The Inquiry report (‘the Walker report’) found that the majority of these 
experiments, conducted by a number of forensic personnel at the NSWIFM, were unlawful. Bret Walker SC 
conducted a careful analysis of the scope and meaning of the law that regulates post-mortem and 
anatomical examinations, including issues of organ and tissue retention and forensic experiments, and 
found it wanting (Walker 2001: 10). 
This journal article is available in Law Text Culture: https://ro.uow.edu.au/ltc/vol10/iss1/5 
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Fugitive performances
of death and injury
Rebecca Scott Bray
Introduction: unlawful experiments
I have certainly myself, I have certainly used a surgical knife and inserted
it — you can call it stabbing if you like — onto a rib, through a rib, or
between a rib, in order to satisfy myself how much force is needed to do
this. This is a question which is put in the court not infrequently. It’s of
great value if the expert witness doesn’t theorise and philosophise, but in
actual fact knows the force that’s required (Hilton Sunday 18 March 2001).1
A legal trial, Felman states, ‘is presumed to be a search for truth, but,
technically, it is a search for a decision, and thus, in essence, it seeks
not simply truth but a finality: a force of resolution’ (1997: 738). The
opening quote to my article reflects one scene of an attempt to support
such resolution — that is, a search for knowledge of the ‘actual’ force
required to injure a body, thereby eliminating or limiting speculation.
Associate Professor John Hilton, a forensic pathologist and the former
Director of the New South Wales Institute of Forensic Medicine
(NSWIFM, also known as ‘the Glebe morgue’), made the remark on
the Australian television program Sunday in March 2001, in response
to a number of allegations, including that dead bodies in the care of the
Institute were subject to ‘unethical’ forensic medical practice, such as
‘stabbing’ experiments, to reproduce or replicate injuries to the
deceased. Public outrage followed his comments and, as a result of the
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allegations raised on Sunday, the then NSW Health Minister launched
an independent inquiry into practices at the mortuary and Hilton was
removed from his position as Director. The Inquiry report (‘the Walker
report’) found that the majority of these experiments, conducted by a
number of forensic personnel at the NSWIFM, were unlawful. Bret
Walker SC conducted a careful analysis of the scope and meaning of
the law that regulates post-mortem and anatomical examinations,
including issues of organ and tissue retention and forensic experiments,
and found it wanting (Walker 2001: 10).
While illustrating one example of the regulation of doubt
(knowledge of the force required to injure a body), Hilton’s statement
also indicates a more extensive catalogue of tensions surrounding the
management of the dead body in law and culture. Placing his statement
at the centre of my discussion, I will argue that this televisual
exhumation of the relationship between mortuary life, culture and law
highlights a dissonance between representing the dead body in
(medico)legal discourse and remembering, or memorialising, the dead
in culture. This tension is informed by an awareness of limits. That is,
the dead body is a finite thing in culture. It is managed temporarily by
forensic medical practices, but thereafter the dead must leave us and
be substituted by images, memories, ashes and so on; they cannot remain
in the figure, as the person, they were. My argument echoes Bronfen,
who writes that with the destabilising event of death, ‘[a] stability of
categories must again be recuperated, namely in the act of
representation, so that we move from the experience of decomposition
to composition, from the dying body/corpse to a representation and
narration of the dying body/corpse’ (1992: 52). Despite this knowledge,
there is a cultural and legal obscurity around the dead body and post-
mortem practices that informs the response to Hilton’s televisual
statement. This article traces the ambivalence associated with
representing the dead, and the literal touch that is required to do so.
To achieve this, my argument is shaped through a four-part structure.
Part 1 places Hilton’s statement in the relevant cultural landscape to
set the scene of crisis around post-mortem practices. Part 2 more fully
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considers the event of Hilton’s statement, exploring the confusion of
legitimate/illegitimate wounding, and the cultural ambivalence towards
medico-legal practice. Parts 3 and 4 analyse the three-fold response to
the crisis of death actioned by forensic pathology’s relationship to law;
it is a precise response, and drives Hilton’s actions. This response begins
as the forensic pathologist performs an autopsy and creates a number
of medico-legal portraits to fix the dead. Such work taps into a
historiography of forensic medicine and Part 3 places Hilton’s statement
within this frame. Secondly, the abstraction of the dead to an image
moves from the mortuary to the courtroom, where the forensic
pathologist stages injury via testimony, often returning to the body to
make medico-legal meaning clear. Thirdly, however, despite the
seeming stability of these images, this ‘reality’ can be challenged by
different interpretations of injury, thereby undoing stable meaning and
potentially rewriting death. Part 4 thus continues to explore the
pathologist’s testimonial role to highlight the problems in turning the
dead body over to representation. In conclusion, I recall the crisis around
the NSWIFM to consider: what is at stake in our attachment to the
image of the dead, and what erupts in the process of the abstraction of
the dead body to image?
1 Mortuary life at the turn of the century:
the restless return of a barely repressed past
The past can only be deciphered, and the only reason for that decipherment
is the interest, pleasure, crisis, or peril of the contemporary (Goodrich
1995: 20).
When Sunday journalist Helen Dalley questioned Associate Professor
Hilton about alleged unethical practices at the NSWIFM, she was
reporting at a time of heightened national and international attention
towards clinical and forensic pathology practices. The Sunday program
was a response to an inquiry launched in October 2000 by the NSW
Minister for Health to review human tissue and organ retention practices
following post-mortems in NSW, including an audit of human tissue
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held in NSW (NSW Health Media Release 10 October 2000). This
review was announced following two substantial inquiries in the United
Kingdom: the Bristol Royal Infirmary Inquiry and the Royal Liverpool
Children’s Inquiry (Alder Hey), followed by the McLean Inquiry in
Scotland.2 The UK inquiries investigated the removal and retention of
organs at post-mortem and revealed that consent procedures relating
to organ and tissue retention had been insufficient, and that in many
cases consent had not been sought or had been over-ridden (see Skene
2002a, 2002b, Harris 2002, Brazier 2002, Mason & Laurie 2001).
The NSW inquiry interim report was released in March 2001. It
identified that, as in the UK, organs have been collected and stored in
NSW without the knowledge of next-of-kin (NSW Health Department
February 2001). In response to the NSW inquiry and the release of the
interim report, Sunday aired allegations that the problems went beyond
the scope of that inquiry. It alleged that the NSWIFM was virtually a
‘body parts supermarket for medical researchers’, that there was
significant post-mortem retention of organs (such as brains) and other
human material (such as bones), and the use of this material for medical
research was questionable (Sunday 18 March 2001). Sunday also raised
allegations of improper conduct in relation to dead bodies; allegations
that began to echo an earlier investigation into the Institute in 1998.
The 1998 inquiry by the Independent Commission against Corruption
(ICAC) revealed that mortuary workers had stolen property from the
deceased (Scott Bray 1999). Forensic workers adversely named in the
ICAC report told Sunday about practices on bodies, including the
removal of spinal columns, long bones and joints for research purposes,
and ‘stabbing’ experiments involving the replication of injuries to the
deceased. It was here that Associate Professor Hilton articulated that
he had inserted a knife into a body to determine the force required to
injure.
The NSW Minister for Health immediately responded by
announcing an inquiry into the NSWIFM (NSW Health Media Release
18 March 2001). The attention towards NSWIFM practices reflected
in part an emerging consideration of legislation in Australian states
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and territories regarding post-mortem practices and the retention of
human tissue and organs.3 Since the UK inquiries and the NSW inquiry
into post-mortem organ removal and retention, pathological post-
mortem practices throughout Australia have been the subject of
newspaper reports in most states. Much attention has been given to the
retention and storage of body parts (such as brains and hearts) without
consent after coronial and hospital autopsies, and the reactions of people
discovering that they had buried their deceased without some organs,
tantamount to burying an ‘incomplete’ body (The Advertiser 27 June
2001: 1, Sydney Morning Herald [SMH] 19 March 2001: 3). When
The Sydney Morning Herald ran a story on the NSWIFM, it recalled a
history of revealed concerns, including the 1994 discovery that body
parts removed in NSW mortuaries were transported to Queensland for
incineration (SMH 19 March 2001: 3). Allegations also emerged in
South Australia of the removal and ‘swapping’ of body parts between
dead bodies, leading the SA Human Services Minister to announce an
inquiry into the post-mortem retention of body parts (The Australian 3
July 2001: 8, Herald Sun 3 July 2001: 11).
The newspaper coverage of the NSWIFM and wider organ retention
issues is extensive.4 The issues raised constitute an eddy of concerns
relating to allegations of unethical or improper movement and treatment
of, touch on and interference with dead bodies. These concerns resound
with the public need to investigate death (and examine organs to further
medical research), and the private (and cultural) need for individuals
to put dead bodies to ‘rest’ (The Australian 21 March 2001: 12). As
governments around Australia investigated both the treatment of dead
bodies in mortuary space and wider organ and tissue retention practices,
the cultural landscape suggested that pathology practices assumed
‘secret’, infinite examination and touching of dead bodies and body
parts. This contradicted the understanding of families that bodies had
been wholly ritually disposed of. The retention of ‘body parts’ without
public knowledge thus elicits the return and circulation of dead bodies
dispersed throughout medical and legal institutions. This touch




Echoing the UK inquiries, situations in Australia raised the
possibility of organ retrieval so that families could obtain retained
material and conduct further burials or cremation. This troubling and
distressing scenario of retrieval maintains the traumatic and literal
resurgence of the dead body in culture. This unspeakable presence of
dead bodies as ‘body parts’ not only exists in opposition to the cultural
limit of dealing with the dead (as a finite figure), it reminds us of the
traumatic fracture of the dead that occurs post-mortem, where bodies
are dissected. Even worse, in spite of funerary rituals of closure, the
dead remain, in pieces. The UK and Australian inquiries identified the
benefits of using tissue and organs obtained post-mortem for medical
research. The distinguishing issue in all cases was knowledge of
retention (and thus the matter of ‘consent’). Following this, there is an
identified need for public awareness of pathology practices that rely
upon the investigation of death (by way of retained organ and tissue
examination), and the practice of scientific experiments that can aid
forensic knowledge.5 These practices depend upon the retention and
circulation of human organs and tissue, and thus the dispersal of the
body after death. Again, this dispersal is contrary to the cultural limit
of the finite dead body (Mason & Laurie 2001).
This was the cultural landscape across which Hilton’s televisual
statement was broadcast in March 2001. The title of the segment —
‘The Body Snatchers’ — efficiently raised the spectre of grave robbing
by the ‘resurrectionists’ that haunts the history of anatomical medicine
in 18th and 19th century Britain, and the popular textuality of the
resurrected ‘living’ dead exemplified in films such as Invasion of the
Body Snatchers (1956) and Night of the Living Dead (1968) (Richardson
1988, Jones 2000, see also Žižek 1991: 22–3). The UK inquiries further
secured this history as a contemporary concern, and allegations
throughout the states and territories of Australia attached these scenes
to Australian mortuaries, with their own troubled history in managing
the dead (see MacDonald 2005). Specifically situated at the centre of
the NSW controversy was Hilton. In speaking with Sunday, Hilton
became the key figure in this renewed, disquieting historiography of
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medicine and the dead body. In the next section, I am specifically
interested in his role as a forensic pathologist, and the perceived
perversion of this role in the aftermath of the Sunday program.
2 Fugitive performances and the
descent into horror
[O]ne no longer speaks the same death where one no longer speaks the
same language (Derrida 1993: 24).
What emerged in the wake of the Sunday revelations and the discussion
of pathology practices in the media was a horror at mortuary practice.6
Interviewed by Sunday a week after ‘The Body Snatchers’ aired, the
Minister for Health stated he was ‘frankly sickened’ by the allegations,
and the NSW Premier added he was ‘numb with horror’ (Sunday 25
March 2001). This descent into horror was also expressed in a media
statement issued by the Minister when the Inquiry report was released
in August 2001. The Minister said: ‘I have said all along that while I,
like most people, find it hard to contemplate the kind of work that goes
on in morgues, I know it is important and necessary work and I do not
want to see forensic science impeded in NSW’ (NSW Health Media
Release 17 August 2001). In light of the practices investigated by the
inquiry, the ‘kind of work that goes on in morgues’ that the Minister
speaks of is ambivalent — if necessary — activity. It is only by way of
sanctioned results and community benefits that such touching is
tolerated. Even then, as the Minister himself stated, the ‘kinds of things
that go on in morgues’ are ‘hard to contemplate’ (NSW Health Media
Release 17 August 2001). It is the aim of this section to retrace the
wounds opened by the Sunday program in relation to Hilton’s statement.
Latter parts of this article query the role of and expectations on forensic
pathologists that motivated Hilton’s attention to forensic experiments
to augment his value for law. However, in this section I want to home
back in on Hilton’s statement, to more fully uncover what is at stake in
imagining mortuary practices (Young 1996).
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It is in light of law’s expectations that Hilton defended his actions
in the days following the Sunday report. He is quoted as stating that
NSWIFM practices were conducted ‘in the interests of justice’ (Whelan
& Brown 2001: 27). One newspaper article focused at length on Hilton
and his role. The authors wrote:
Of course the bodies were treated with respect, he said. But they also had
to be dissected, subjected to whatever treatment was necessary to determine
the cause of death, to put together cogent evidence that would stand up to
cross-examination, and to build up a body of empirical data. “If I give an
opinion in court on the likely cause of death, and counsel asks on what I
have based my opinion, if I have experimental data on my side, I am in a
much stronger position,” he said (Whelan & Brown 2001: 27).
It is worth examining this position more closely, especially in light of
the findings of the NSW inquiry. Six months after Hilton uttered his
remark on Sunday, Bret Walker SC published his findings.7 Walker
comments on a number of alleged statutory contraventions and alleged
unethical practices at the NSWIFM including removal and retention
of brains, long bones and joints, however my specific concern
throughout this article is with forensic experiments. In reading the
Walker report, it becomes evident that courts both ask and expect the
forensic pathologist to speak beyond the dead body and this relationship
to criminal justice explains both the professional interest of pathologists
in injury and the forensic relevance of experiments. That is, law asks
the pathologist to comment on aspects of injury — such as force required
to injure — which may be used to impute others. Through understanding
and exercising accuracy (stabbing experiments to ascertain the force
required to injure), medico-legal knowledge, and the resultant images
and texts, may be liberated from ambivalence, which may in turn readily
identify criminal others. Such is their legal and cultural weight — that
they may discover volition and ratify evidence of criminality. Walker
summarises this perspective as follows:
As to stabbing experiments generally, it is to be borne in mind that the
difference between crimes involving knives and accidents involving knives
is a perennial and crucial one. Conviction and very long imprisonment
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follow from knife murders, and acquittal may result where there has simply
been a fatal accident. In between, different degrees of criminality, and thus
appropriate punishment, may follow depending on the aggressive intention
attributed by a criminal court to a person accused of killing with a knife.
For these reasons, it has long been a topic of professional interest to forensic
pathologists, who are the leading expert witnesses in criminal justice on
such matters, how one may safely (if at all) infer the force or strength of a
blow (and thus inferentially the mental volition behind it) from the depth
or nature of the resultant penetration. … The scientific endeavour of such
work is manifest. Its forensic relevance is clear (2001: 74–5).
Hilton’s actions thus have the potential to make ‘real’ the intentions
and actions of the criminal other. Yet Hilton’s insertions into the dead
body bring him perilously close to not only the dead but also to the
body of the criminal. In the wake of the NSWIFM crisis, he is seen to
embody both law and unlawfulness — a bi-lingual body incising on
behalf of the law so as to (possibly) speak of criminal intent. Therefore
the call for precise bridging between the dead body and law installs
ambiguity to the forensic pathologist. In the situation of Hilton, injury
becomes indexed to his body. Furthermore, by raising two terms
describing injury — ‘inserted’ and ‘stabbing’ — Hilton highlights
language’s devastating slipperiness as his statement precipitates utterly
traumatic visuals. Divulged in the media and thus loosened from
‘scientific’ context, the language of forensic touch here escalates and
Hilton becomes the accused. Hilton summarises this linguistic fragility
when he says ‘you can call it stabbing if you like’ (Sunday 18 March
2001). The slipperiness of language thus laces Hilton to legal perversion.
The image this scene of ‘stabbing’ yields elevates forensic vision and
knowledge-production as violence, where Hilton’s ambiguous touch
bespeaks a cultural confusion with crime and the law. This scene of
wounding haunts as repetitious puncturing, and as such, acts as a
reminder of the unseen forensic spaces and touches on the mute figure
of the dead. Death, then, becomes an event for translation, and this
translation itself also becomes inescapably strange.
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The attention given to Hilton’s actions suggests that in securing
knowledge about the body, the potential for representational disorder
emerges. Thus, within a perversion of duty, the forensic pathologist is
declared an illegal agent of trauma rather than the legal agent for the
articulation of trauma. Hilton defended his position by somewhat
echoing this perversion. When asked about ‘stabbing’ experiments,
and experiments generally, one newspaper report quoted Hilton as
saying, ‘[o]f course it is distasteful. It’s distasteful to me, for God’s
sake’ (in Whelan & Brown 2001: 27). As stated earlier, compelled by
his role for law, Hilton elevates the collective over the individual body,
making insertions, conducting and authorising experiments in ‘the
interests of justice’ (in Whelan & Brown 2001: 27).
Whilst recognising the benefits of forensic experiments, the Walker
report deemed the majority of experiments conducted by a number of
forensic personnel at the NSWIFM unlawful and the law in this area
unclear. Under the Anatomy Act 1977 (NSW) corpses could be donated
for the purposes of anatomical examination — defined as
‘disaggregation’ of the bodies and its parts (Walker 2001: 32–3). Walker
explored the history of what he terms the ‘pivotal phrase’ for anatomical
examination, which governs the purpose for which dead bodies are
made available as constituted by the 1881 NSW legislation, derived
closely from Westminster (2001: 30–2). In addition to commenting on
the statutory history of the phrase, Walker also commented on the
etymological history of the word ‘anatomize’ (Walker 2001: 32–3).
Consequently, experiments not restricted to disaggregation (such as
hammer or stabbing experiments) were not authorised by the Act
(Walker 2001: 33). Unlawful conduct at the NSWIFM therefore
stemmed from ‘ignorance of the law or at least a mistaken view of the
limits imposed on statutory authority by reason of particular legislative
phraseology’ (2001: 88).
Correspondingly, in light of the forensic relevance of experiments
and their benefits for criminal justice, Walker identified a ‘gap in
beneficial legislation’ as the law did not authorise experiments
considered of clear forensic and thus judicial benefit (2001: 73, see
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also Ranson 2001).8 Demonstrating the inconsistency of the law in this
area, Walker commented on one stabbing situation where a forensic
pathologist lawfully demonstrated bone and cartilage resistance to knife
penetration by inserting blades into a chest plate removed under the
Coroners Act 1980 (NSW) for the purposes of the coronial post-mortem
examination (Walker 2001: 73–4). In distinction to other experiments
on donated bodies, or coronial cases where the body part had not been
removed, this exercise was deemed lawful because the body part had
been removed for the purpose of the post-mortem examination under
the Coroners Act. Walker concludes that ‘the law should not distinguish
in this fashion’ (2001: 74). The law here is noted as inadequate and
incomplete. Mistakes and misreadings are to be expected in the lack of
law’s attention to its own gap.
The inquiry additionally found that the law was misunderstood,
leading to NSWIFM staff breaches of the limits of lawful forensic
practice in relation to the dead body and the purpose of coronial post-
mortem examinations (Walker 2001). This misleading view of the law
was interpreted as looking beyond law (exceeding the strict limit of
the letter of law). In summarising, Walker states that ‘[p]ut simply, it is
for law rather than individual conscience to regulate the social compact
by which dead bodies and human remains are interfered with by
compulsory State process’ (2001: 69). Walker additionally notes that
ethical practice requires forensic personnel to be well versed in the
limit, noting that ethics ‘starts with a thoroughgoing compliance with
the statutory requirements of and limits on one’s own conduct’
(2001: 87–8). Here we witness a tension between a legal agenda that
requires evidence from forensic pathologists, and an opposing agenda
that restricts the forensic work that develops this expertise, a point I
will return to in Part 4 below.
The practices ‘revealed’ by Sunday and discussed in the media,
demonstrate the struggle of the forensic pathologist to unambiguously
exercise an authoritative touch on the dead body. The next section
explores more fully the numerous forensic images generated in the
search for this authoritative closure of the crisis around death.
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3 Training the eye:
the historiography of forensic medicine
Some of the questions that pathologists must answer, however, cannot be
easily studied. … No one is going to volunteer to be the subject in an
experiment to test whether a certain sort of stab wound was caused by a
certain sort of blow with a certain sort of knife (Redmayne 2001: 131).
Pugliese has written of the forensic pathologist as an ‘intermediary’
between the dead body and the autopsy report and oral testimony
(2002: 369). It is the critical nature of this intermediary role that interests
me here. To understand more fully why Hilton invested in experimental
touches, it is necessary to explore the practices of forensic pathology,
and the process of the translation of the dead, that Pugliese underscores
in his analysis. Inherent in this translation, I argue, is the proliferation
of images that highlight the peculiarities of representing the dead body
for law, which I examine more fully in the following section. The
translation of the dead body into representation has been explored by
Bronfen, who notes that the translation ‘opens up a plurality of meaning
and reference’ where ‘[t]he translation into representation is one that
permits a break with the material referent of the signifier — and in the
gap that is opened it can refer either to the real body, to a gliding chain
of culturally coded signifiers or to the producer of the representation’
(1992: 46). I explore the implications of this later, but note here that to
achieve this translation, forensic pathology thus necessarily relies upon
the image. Therefore, this section explores the creation of images (as
undeniable tools for law) and their representational value.
The forensic translation begins when the dead body is examined at
the crime scene or received at the mortuary. Here, I am speaking about
deaths to be investigated by the coroner. The deaths that fall within the
coronial jurisdiction are prescribed by the Coroners Acts of each state
and territory; referred to in (most) jurisdictions as ‘reportable deaths’.9
As part of the investigation of the death the coroner orders a post-
mortem examination, the goal of which is to confirm or determine
identity, cause and circumstances of death as prescribed in Coroners
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Acts throughout Australia.10 Once delivered to the mortuary, that space
of strict regulation and seclusion, law’s representational alliance with
the body intensifies, as the deceased is tagged, weighed and registered
through imaging procedures such as X-ray, video recording and
photography (Ranson 1992, 1996, 1998a, 1998b, Freckelton & Ranson
2006).11 Imaging the body to both detect and record injury is considered
of vital importance in the examination of death and accompanies a
thorough analysis of trauma (Cordner & Plueckhahn 1991, Di Maio &
Dana 1998, Cordner & Ranson 1999, Freckelton & Ranson 2006).
Imaging practices optimise forensic vision as they can attest to the
unseen presence of injury (for example, fractures detected through X-
ray) and the specifics of injury. It is useful here to note that issues of
accuracy and precision in investigating injury bear a direct relation to
the transient and disintegrating status of the dead body; forensic
practices directly call upon the image to manage this movement. As
the body is examined, both externally and internally, images, such as
photographs, record the process of autopsy, recording all-over general
views of the front and back of the body (clothed and unclothed,
unwashed and washed) thereafter canvassing the interior after the body
is opened (Cordner & Ranson 1999: 446–7). The post-mortem
examination is inseparable from representation, as images of the body
develop from reading, measuring, photographing, X-ray or sketching
the body contemporaneous to analysis (Ranson 1996, Pugliese 2005).
In addition, body samples are collected, blood and other fluids are drawn
and tested. Ante-mortem records are gathered and reports are written.
From these activities, significant memoranda are built. This scission
and fracture of the body turns the dead body entirely over to
representation.12
Amidst all this activity, the chief specialty of the forensic pathologist
is the interpretation of injury and pathology. As Freckelton and Ranson
note: ‘[i]t is the interpretation of injuries with regard to their causation
and effects and the interpretation of the effects of natural disease that
lie at the heart of the expertise of the forensic pathologist’ (2006: 447).
In examining the dead and identifying what has gone wrong, the forensic
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pathologist concentrates on the language of injury and trauma. This
language has precise significance and includes the classification of
injuries — such as abrasions, lacerations, bruises, incised wounds et
cetera — which have particular characteristics (Cordner & Ranson
1999). Freckelton and Ranson state that ‘perhaps the most important
aspect of classification is the fact that different injuries imply different
forms of causation — correctly describing an injury can provide a more
accurate reconstruction of the events that led to the injury’ (2006: 453).
They go on to note the value of attention to injury patterns:
The interpretation of wound patterns is as important as the interpretation
of the causation of individual wounds. The existence of a deliberately
inflicted fatal wound does not necessarily imply criminality or negligent
behaviour. The circumstances in which the wound occurred usually have
far greater legal significance … than does the mechanistic interpretation
of how the wound was caused … experience of examining individuals
with numerous wounds shows that there are common patterns. It is
familiarity with these patterns that allows the forensic pathologist to express
his or her opinion about both the physical and sociological aspects of the
wounding. … An understanding of the social settings in which trauma
occurs, as well as skill in interpreting the appearance of wounds, can provide
extremely valuable information (2006: 477).
Here we see a move from the specifics of the dead body to matters of
significance beyond the individual. The forensic pathologist becomes
one who details individual material trauma that will ultimately speak
of ‘culture’, engaging in a form of ‘forensic sociology’ (see for example
Polk 1994). If we return to Hilton’s interview on Sunday, he followed
up his comment by adding that ‘I felt I was justified in doing it because
it was going to help other people down the track’ (18 March 2001).
Indeed, recent literature characterises forensic pathology practice as
an activity in commune with the living, as death examination and
subsequent knowledge about injury disperses into public health policy
and planning, community health and safety, education, and therapeutic
development (Ranson 1992, 1996, Cordner & Ranson 1999).
This entanglement of the forensic pathologist into spaces beyond
the body will be further discussed in the following section. What I
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want to note here is that in repeatedly identifying patterns and learning
of circumstances of death and injury, forensic pathology, as a discourse,
is built from a history that remembers the body, signifying a medico-
legal impetus that transcends the present and contributes to an expanding
historical enterprise. As individual dead are translated, this translation
embraces innumerable bodies — those dead already enlisted in texts
and others yet to come. The translative force of this process is thus
founded in tracking the corpse as familiar. This process installs the
pathologist as the privileged interpreter of death and the body, who
retains knowledge and stores this insight for both present events and
future recall. As the next section explores, representations, as
supplements, aid this recall.
The medico-legal memory of the body therefore resides in the
proliferation of texts and images of the dead. These pieces of
representation — photographs, video, X-ray, anatomical body charts
or sketches, medical notes and autopsy reports — achieve the following:
they align others with the forensic pathologist’s insight and, in so doing,
signify the faith in representation to deliver the real. Cordner and Ranson
note that one of the aims of the forensic pathology investigation is:
To record all the relevant observations and negative findings in such a way
that they can be used effectively to communicate the information obtained
from the autopsy to the court and legal agencies. If the documentation is
comprehensive, it should come close to providing another pathologist with
the information needed to put that person in the same position as the
pathologist performing the autopsy (1999: 440).
Accurate citation of the body can therefore substitute the pathologist,
situating others in proximity to the dead. An exhaustive forensic
response thus achieves and archives the ‘clear picture of what has been
seen’, and concentrates fragments with the force of the real (Cordner
& Plueckhahn 1991: 174). It is the precise drive to summarise and
learn of the body that generates these forensic portraits. The paradox
is, that in creating numerous images to adequately capture injury, the
stability of the forensic image is disrupted by this proliferation of texts.
What may be seen in law’s definitive desire for closure, expressed in
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the forensic drive for conclusion, are medico-legal images that in fact
signify representational flux. As the next section will discuss, no singular
representation can grasp the three-dimensional dead body, and thus
forensic representation umpires a real that is consistent with fracture.
Hilton recalls this gap in signification when he states ‘[i]t’s of great
value if the expert witness doesn’t theorise and philosophise, but in
actual fact knows the force that’s required’ (Sunday 18 March 2001).
This focus on personal knowledge, harboured in memory as a material
witness, is what also interests me next.
4 Medico-legal portraits of death and injury:
legal agendas and the forensic pathologist
The law … believes that while people may lie, the body generally tells the
truth, providing the test and diagnosis are clear enough. Medicine, for law,
functions to guarantee body-truth (Phelan 1997: 95).
The Walker report highlights that forensic pathologists in New South
Wales have negotiated between competing legal agendas: firstly, the
legal agenda that asks forensic pathologists to provide expert opinion
and ‘legal’ answers as to the type and character of wounds, and secondly
the law that restricts forensic pathologists from conducting the work
needed to form their opinions and educate others. As noted in Part 2
above, Walker affirmed the serious scientific, forensic and educational
work of experiments, and the implications of such work for expert
testimony, and also commented on the unlawfulness of experiments
due to, for example, the legislative restrictions around the statutory
phrase for anatomical examination. Walker reiterates throughout his
report that experiments were undertaken seriously and scientifically
and, commenting on a specific exercise, notes it was undertaken ‘for
the purposes of the administration of justice as that is informed by
forensic pathology’ (2001: 71). This section is interested in the agenda
that seeks evidence from the forensic pathologist, and the issue of touch
and demonstration inherent in this expertise. Notwithstanding the
specialism developed from personal knowledge about injury, forensic
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pathology practices exist in tension with cultural and individual
remembrance of the dead.
The importance of medico-legal testimony is described by Cordner
and Ranson, who note that the forensic pathologist’s focus ‘is the end-
point of the forensic investigation, which is the judicial process, usually
a criminal court trial or coroner’s inquest’ (1999: 413). Ranson similarly
states that delivering medico-legal results to law is the ‘principal output’
of the labour of forensic medicine (1996: 29). Therefore, it is the work
of this section to more fully explore the ways in which the forensic
pathologist represents the dead body in court. To examine the
importance of their testimonial function, I partially draw upon
interviews I have conducted with forensic pathologists.
As translators of the dead body, forensic pathologists provide expert
medical evidence attesting, if possible, to the cause and manner of
death of the deceased. In so doing, and, as we know from Hilton’s
statement and the Walker report, forensic pathologists are often called
upon in courts to comment on issues related to injury, such as
circumstances, force, which wound was caused first, weapon type et
cetera (Freckelton & Ranson 2006). At the heart of this summons is an
attempt to eliminate doubt at the body of the dead as expert opinion
can distinguish between the classification, characteristics and causation
of injuries. The admissibility of differing expert opinion about the nature
of injury has been subject to appeal before the courts; consequent
judgments note the field of injury interpretation and forensic medical
knowledge as a field of specialism and expertise. For example, in
Middleton v The Queen Anderson J held that issues of whether wounds
were self-inflicted are:
matters the full significance of which might not be appreciated by the
layman unaided by evidence from a person skilled in interpreting wounds.
Although the untrained eye is able to see wounds and observe their severity
and the pattern of them and where they are on the body and so on, the
question as to what features are significant and the inferences to be drawn




Despite this acceptance, the courts may sometimes reluctantly
concede the expertise of injury interpretation. In R v Anderson, a case
involving expert opinion evidence on whether wounds to the defendant
were self-inflicted (thereby potentially extinguishing claims of self-
defence and provocation), Winneke P expressed ‘difficulty in
comprehending how a person, medically qualified or not, by merely
observing wounds, can express an opinion that they have been “self-
inflicted.” However, I am prepared to accept that such a body of
knowledge exists’ (2000 at 55). There is an acceptance at common law
of forensic medical expertise and that it can involve the field of injury
interpretation. I want to query the function of the forensic pathologist
that surfaced in the cultural crisis of Hilton’s statement, studying it in
light of the value of the forensic pathologist for law. Armed with
specialised training and forensic experience, Hilton’s statement
concerns his capacity to function effectively as an expert.
Importantly, this function is driven by the material absence of the
dead body but nonetheless signals a return to the material (corporeal)
witness; although this time, it is the body of the pathologist. Forensic
pathologists often explain injury through the performance of their own
body in court. This substitution is a response to the inexact accounts
provided through medico-legal pieces such as photographs, written
text and verbal testimony. As aids to describe the dead body, these
pieces are often insufficient to produce clear meaning for the court. In
interview one forensic pathologist discussed the difficulty with trying
to explain three-dimensional human anatomy in court, stating that
people usually think of the body as ‘solid, rigid, not flexible and
moving’. They continued:
[W]hen the alleged statement by the shooter and the injuries to the victim
are such as to say “well when this person was shot they had to be two foot
in the air leaning backwards at an angle of thirty-five degrees” people say
“well that’s impossible, you can’t be suspended two-feet in the air … leaning
backwards by thirty-five degrees”. And of course you can’t in a static sense,
but you could in a dynamic sense … but … it’s hard to represent that …
that’s why the use of your own body is useful in court. It’s much better to
put a pen to the side of my head showing the direction than it is to say
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“well it was going backwards at forty-five degrees and downwards by
thirty-five degrees and medially by this degree”. … it has no real meaning
(P P Interview 11 October 1999).
The value of the forensic pathologist therefore resides in staging
injury and returning to the material body to make ‘real’ (the) meaning
of death, thereby enabling the court to comprehend death three-
dimensionally. This return to the body marks the ‘miss’ of
representations such as photographs and utterance, and the cultural
and legal strength of the body to express reality. Injury and death are
read in accordance with a material ‘truth’ that cannot always be
verbalised, but which may be gestured or figured (Bronfen 1992: 52).
Just as forensic pathologists translate the dead body into medico-legal
images, they again reinterpret these images for law via expert testimony.
As a bridge between the dead body and law, the forensic pathologist
signifies the ‘ambivalent and indeterminant shift between real body
and substituting image’ (Bronfen 1992: 52). Correspondingly, this
performance also destabilises a fixed reading of death from that
otherwise figured in partial portraits of injury, such as forensic
photographs or written texts. This is not to say that photographs of
wounds are inaccurate records of injury, or that pathologists perform
in opposition to these portraits. Instead, the testimony of the pathologist
demonstrates the contradiction in stability provided through
representations of the dead body. That is, images inadequately capture
the dynamic body. Since the corpse is seen through fractured images
that require explanation, the stability of meaning achieved by
representation is dubious.
In terms of the dead body, reinterpretation of injury can emerge in
the expert testimony of a pathologist called for the defence. In Australia
the testimony of a defence pathologist is not contingent upon touching
or directly witnessing the dead body at autopsy; they read injury
primarily through the medico-legal image. In interview, one forensic
pathologist noted the irony that defence pathologists ‘can honestly stand
by a remote hypothetical situation because they haven’t had that
removed from their armory of possible scenarios by actually seeing
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more evidence that would lead them to say “well that couldn’t happen
after all”’ (P P Interview 11 October 1999).
Medico-legal images can simultaneously memorialise an original
touch that can refresh an expert’s memory, renew narrative and yet
prompt difference in expert opinion. The move from the reality to the
‘virtuality’ of the body in the image paradoxically depends on, yet
departs from, the definitive ‘original’ touch (Pugliese 2002: 370). Where
the forensic pathologist records the dead body in such a way as to
ascribe similar insight to other qualified pathologists, injury can now
be revised in representational gaps. Therefore, the prospect of
substitution, of handling the body by way of the image, is inexact. Just
as repetition as reformulation inscribes anew, pathology’s first touch is
both echoed and lost (Bronfen 1992: 324). The picture becomes a point
of tension, a place of additional interpretation. In considering the role
of defence pathology, one forensic pathologist stated: ‘I believe I’m in
a better position to say what went on than someone who hasn’t actually
dealt with the body’ (W S Interview 14 March 2000). Yet, while talking
about the value of the direct touch for legal testimony, another forensic
pathologist noted the touch as possible subsidiary; they said:
I’ve often argued “well you had to be there to look at the body”. The photo
… does not show this three-dimensional quality … but … how good is a
jury at evaluating the significance of three-dimensional involvement in
the body as opposed to two-dimensional analysis? (G F Interview 18
October 1999).
Consequently, the dead body is filtered through images which attest
to an original touch, but which also support re-readings that reconfigure
meaning. Consequently, the idea of an ‘originary’ touch actually echoes
the historiography of forensic medicine, a history that launches the
experience (and expertise) of forensic pathologists outlined here and
in Part 3 (Pugliese 2002: 370, Bronfen 1992). As I have outlined, in
court, the forensic pathologist is the figure of relational value and this
testimony is entangled in questions of touch. Within the confines of
medico-legal discourse this touch remains necessary and desirable.
Hilton’s statement certainly indicates that this section’s discussion of
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touch and substitution demonstrates that personal knowledge, as part
of forensic medical historiography, is significant. Yet clearly, the cultural
attention towards pathology practices illustrates that this history is seen
to operate in opposition to efforts of individual and cultural
memorialisation of the dead. Indeed, the issues raised by a lack of
legal clarity around how dead bodies are managed, in addition to
forensic pathologists’ negotiation of this confusion where law asks for
specialism and cultural fears about unethical treatment in mortuaries,
has significant implications including, as Ranson notes, ‘the tendency
to confuse the community and, at worst, to bring the law into this area
into disrepute’ (2001: 154).
Conclusion: investigating lacunae
The reason why it’s valid to ask a pathologist as opposed to anyone else is
that of course, in most cases, in most of those killing injuries, the pathologist
will in their career have inflicted most of those injuries on a body in one
form or another. Though not in that way, hopefully. So, in other words, if
the argument is “well how much force does it take to stick a knife through
X, Y and Z?”, well because the pathologist is probably one of the few
people in the community who has stuck knives through X, Y and Z as part
of their ordinary daily work, they’re the only people who are going to
know how, what it takes. So that’s a real, pragmatic and experiential basis
for opinion making (P P Interview 11 October 1999).
In the everyday labour of forensic pathology, infliction of ‘injury’ is
not uncommon and this experience can yield juridical benefits. I include
this statement on the ‘pragmatism’ of forensic pathology in my
conclusion to highlight the themes of this article. Firstly, as scientific
knowledge, forensic pathology is concerned with precise, ‘objective’
attention to detail, such as classifying injuries (Pugliese 2004).
Correspondingly, the retrieval of a precise touch ghosts the
experimentally driven touch of Hilton. His efforts to know of another’s
touch — ‘in order to satisfy myself how much force is needed to do
this’ — nevertheless disturbs the image of closure that prescribes
mortuary space. It paradoxically introduces cultural doubt into spaces
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of forensic practice. This doubt illustrates the tensions between culture
that needs to put the dead to rest, and medico-legal knowledge which
requires a corpus (corpses) to qualify knowledge. Here, the cultural
horizon of looking at the dead is a limit that is weighted to time and
space whereas law paradoxically desires re-narration and redefinition
in the elimination of doubt. Since medico-legal knowledge has
historically been gained through troubling practices such as experiments
and organ retention, Hilton reveals forensic pathology’s seemingly
‘endless’ incisions into the body.
Furthermore, Hilton’s comment encapsulates the panic of
signification that constitutes language. As the word ‘stabbing’ in Hilton’s
statement mobilises numerous, repetitive images of violence, it offers
a sliding language of injury that both bespeaks and belies scientific
precision. The statement illustrates the difficulties in articulating
methods of forensic knowledge using terms of language that are already
unstable and signifies the problems inherent in the creation of a ‘material
witness’ (a valid image of death born of a ‘real’ body). The response to
Hilton’s interview on Sunday illustrates that the imperiled translation
of the dead is always proximate to the body of the forensic pathologist.
As the intimate reader of the dead, the forensic pathologist moves close
to the body to diagnose trauma. This enables superlative insight —
‘I’ve often argued “well you had to be there to look at the body”’ —
yet constitutes a fraught privilege (G F Interview 18 October 1999).
Following this culturally questionable proximity that alerts the
community to unlawful forensic practices, law’s ambiguous touch here
recalls the spectre. That is, forensic authority is interlaced with a criminal
shape, one that both embodies and breaks the law to know the limit
(see Hutchings 2001, Biber 2006). At the same time that forensic
pathology authorises itself by building bodily histories, it has been
presented as a practice that looks beyond law.
As I have identified, the Walker report found a number of problems
with the law in this area. The inquiry found that the law was unclear
and was misunderstood by forensic specialists, leading to breaches of
the limits of lawful forensic practice in relation to the dead body and
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the purpose of coronial post-mortem examinations (Walker 2001).
Notwithstanding these breaches, Walker concluded that ‘the motivations
and methods of all those involved were respectful of the donated bodies
and sincere as to their beliefs that what they were doing was permissible.
They should not be individually criticized for their mistaken views of
the law’ (2001: 72–3). The insufficiency of the law which fails to fully
regulate ‘the social compact by which dead bodies and human remains
are interfered with by compulsory State process’ thus emerges as a
crucial problem, where the law fails to effectively adjudicate these
fraught tensions between representing and remembering the dead
(2001: 69). Here, the law inadequately sanctions the examination and
management of the dead body, lending confusion not only to the
community, but also to the specialists charged with the responsibility
of managing the dead. Following the Walker report, it emerges that
forensic pathologists have navigated an inchoate legal path to develop
their expertise.
The lacunae of death therefore widen, as forensic personnel,
legislation and media reports miss the mark in the aftermath of death.
In this sense, forensic workers exceeded the (unsatisfactory) limits of
law in their service for law and trauma surged unconfined by law in
law’s spaces. What emerges is the struggle of forensic service with
both the law and wider culture — the latter exemplified in media
attention that intensely closed in on Hilton seeking response and redress.
Assuaging this ambivalence, Walker states that misreadings of the law
are commonplace, and a matter of language — a ‘particular legislative
phraseology’ — and that ‘people do misunderstand or make mistakes
about the law, from time to time’ (2001: 88). Correspondingly and given
this lacunae in law, he also noted that the unlawful experiments reflected
a deficiency of ‘adequate legal instruction concerning the use of dead
bodies and human remains’ (Walker 2001: 71). In light of the fact that
the activities were founded in respect, with serious forensic, scientific
and educational purposes, the report concludes that, crucially, the
language used by the media misrepresented the situation (Walker
2001: 71–3). The Walker report also made a number of
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recommendations for reforms to the law which were effected by the
Human Tissue and Anatomy Legislation Amendment Act 2003 (NSW),
including clarification of the statutory phrase ‘anatomical examination’
that covers subjecting the body to an experiment for medical or scientific
purposes, clarification of the purpose of the coronial post-mortem
examination and consent requirements around the use of human tissue.
It is appropriate, in my closing paragraph, to recall the media and
their gothic imagination of Hilton. The crisis around the NSWIFM
reminds us that imagination of mortuary practices betrays the apparent
fluency of law’s administration of death. To bridle doubt law must
exacerbate the wound, cut into the body and interrogate the gaps. These
are scenes of acute ambivalence, no matter how the legislation is
worded. Consequently, of crucial concern here have been the troubling
images that come to us in the aftermath of death. These images signal
the difficulties associated with managing the dead, as they force us to
imagine the touch that is required to do so.
Notes
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1 For the Sunday program transcript see: <http://news.ninemsn.com.au/
sunday/cover_transcripts>.
2 See respectively <www.bristol-inquiry.org.uk>, <www.rlcinquiry.org.uk>,
<www.show.scot.nhs.uk/scotogrev/Final%20Report/ropm-00.htm>.
3 For example, see Report into the Retention of Body Parts after Postmortems
2001 (SA), Interim and Final Reports of Removal and Retention of Organs
and Tissue Following Post-Mortem Examinations 2001 (WA). Following
the recommendations of the WA reports, the Non-Coronial Post-Mortem
Examinations Code of Practice 2001 under s32A(1) of the Human Tissue
and Transplant Act 1982 (WA) was developed. Following recommendations
of the Walker report, in 2003 NSW passed the Human Tissue and Anatomy
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Legislation Amendment Act 2003 (NSW) revising earlier incarnations of
the Bill. The SA parliament passed the Transplantation and Anatomy (Post-
Mortem Examinations) Amendment Bill (2004).
4 Please see the reference list for selected details of this coverage. Headlines
included: ‘Donated Corpse used for Stabbing’, ‘Jessie’s Final Indignity’,
‘The Truth can be Distasteful’, ‘Corpse Row Putting off Donors’, ‘Medical
Ethics left at the Morgue Door’, ‘Privacy is Paramount in Ghoulish
Business’, ‘Body Parts Plundered’.
5 Forensic pathologist Stephen Cordner, with Helen McKelvie, published
an article containing post-mortem information in The Sydney Morning
Herald 23 March 2001: 14.
6 Please see media articles in the reference list, and also examples of headlines
at note 4 above.
7 Inquiry into Matters Arising from the Post-mortem and Anatomical
Examination Practices of the Institute of Forensic Medicine:
<www.health.nsw.gov.au/>.
8 The Human Tissue and Anatomy Legislation Amendment Act 2003 (NSW)
sought to address the gaps identified by the Walker report.
9 See Coroners Act 1995 (Tas) s3, Coroners Act 1985 (Vic) s3, Coroners Act
1980 (NSW) s13, Coroners Act 2003 (Qld) s8, Coroners Act 1996 (WA)
s3, Coroners Act 1997 (ACT) s13, Coroners Act 1993 (NT) s12, Coroners
Act 2003 (SA) s3.
10 See Coroners Act 1995 (Tas) s36, Coroners Act 1985 (Vic) s27, Coroners
Act 1980 (NSW) s48, Coroners Act 2003 (Qld) s19, Coroners Act 1996
(WA) s34, Coroners Act 1997 (ACT) s21, Coroners Act 1993 (NT) s20,
Coroners Act 2003 (SA) s22.
11 In this section I am partially referencing practices outlined in interviews
with forensic personnel at the Victorian Institute of Forensic Medicine.
12 On the racialising practices of forensic pathology via the use of body charts
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